On the management of interconnected wildlife populations by Anders Skonhoft & Wenting Chen












On the management of 
interconnected wildlife populations 
Wenting Chen and Anders Skonhoft 



















Department of Economics  
 N-7491 Trondheim, Norway 
www.svt.ntnu.no/iso/wp/wp.htm 




On the management of interconnected wildlife populations 
 
Wenting Chen and Anders Skonhoft 


























   
           2 
ABSTRACT. 
Economic interdependency of wildlife or fish stocks is usually attributed to ecological 
interdependency, such as predator – prey and competitive relationships, or to density 
dependent migration of species between different areas. This paper provides another channel 
for economic interdependency of wildlife where density independent migration and market 
price interaction affect the management strategies among different landowners. Management 
is studied under three market conditions for selling hunting licences: price taking behaviour, 
monopoly market and duopoly market. Harvesting of the Scandinavian moose is used as an 
example. The paper provides several results on how economic interdependency works 
through the migration pattern. When a duopoly market is introduced, hunting license price 
interaction among the landowners plays an additional role in determining the optimal 
harvesting strategy. 
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1. Introduction 
In most models with ecological interdependency, such as predator-prey models and models of 
competition, there is also economic interdependency; that is, the (optimal) exploitation of one 
species, e.g., a fish stock, influences the  exploitation of the other species, and vice versa (e.g., 
Hannesson [1983] and Clark [1990] ). If these species are managed by different agents, there 
will also be economic interdependency between the agents. We find the same situation if 
wildlife or fish stocks disperse in a density dependent manner between different areas, or 
patches, managed by different owners (e.g., Conrad [1999], Sanchirico and Wilen [2001], 
Armstrong and Skonhoft [2005]). Economic interdependency also can occur even without any 
direct biological, or ecological, connections. This may happen when, for example, a migratory 
fish stock is exploited sequentially over the year cycle by different agents (e.g., Charles and 
Reed [1985]), or in fisheries with imperfect selectivity (Clark [1990], Ch. 10). Another 
example is when two agents are supplying fish or wildlife products to a common market 
where the harvested products interact in the market (e.g., Halsema and Withagen [2008]). The 
same may happen in various payment for environmental service (PES) situations, for example, 
when the payment for conserving a wildlife species is related to the stock abundance and 
where the resource owner uses the size of the PES strategically (e.g., Staahler [1996], Bulte 
and van Kooten [2002]). 
 
In this paper, we show that economic interdependency also may occur even when animal 
species migrate in a density independent manner between different areas. The particular case 
under study is Scandinavian moose hunting, where the moose frequently migrate between 
different areas over the annual cycle, depending on snow and forage conditions, and are 
subject to hunting by different landowners. The most common migratory pattern among 
moose is density independent; that is, the migration, or dispersal, is not contingent upon 
species density in the various areas (Saether et al. [1992]). Moose are valuable in the hunting 
season, which takes place in the fall, but cause browsing damage to forest products during the 
winter. Therefore, the moose provides value but is also a pest. It is the browsing damage that 
may create an economic interdependency between different landowners. The moose is one 
example of a species migratory pattern that occurs seasonally over the year and is more or less 
density independent. The wildebeest migration in the Serengeti-Mara ecosystem is a famous 
example of such a pattern (e.g., Sinclair and Arcese [1995]).         4 
The scope of this paper is to study the degree and strength of such economic 
interdependencies under different market and damage cost assumptions. Two landowners and 
two moose subpopulations are considered. The core of the biological model, describing 
harvest, natural growth and migration, draws on Skonhoft and Olaussen [2005], and a 
continuous time version of their model is considered. The model is also extended to a 
dynamic framework where a dynamic open loop game is generated when the market for 
hunting licences is interconnected (e.g., Dockner et al. [2000]). Various economic 
interdependency situations among the landowners are analysed. In these situations, we 
assume that both landowners aim to find hunting quotas that maximize present value net 
benefit, which equals the hunting value minus the forestry damage. Optimal harvest strategies 
in steady state as well as in transitional dynamics will be studied. The various types of 
economic interdependency considered have important management implications, as both 
unidirectional migration and market price interaction play an important role in the harvesting 
decision.  Unified management schemes (the social planner solution) are discussed in 
Skonhoft and Olaussen [2005] and hence are not covered in this paper.  Our model and 
analysis are closest to that of Halsema and Withagen [2008]. Harvest cost functions in their 
model and browsing damage cost functions in our model are both density dependent; that is, 
both models are contingent upon the number of species. The important difference is that we 
include an additional link through the density independent migration of the animals.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. In section two, the ecological model and the cost and 
benefit functions of the landowners are presented. We first study two extreme market 
conditions. The perfect competitive market for selling moose hunting licenses is considered in 
section three, while monopoly power is analyzed in section four.  We find that the 
classification of the moose as a ‘value’ or a ‘pest’ has crucial importance for the dynamics as 
well as for the steady state analysis in the monopoly case. The moose is considered valuable if 
the marginal moose harvest revenue is positive, while it is a pest when the harvest revenue is 
negative. The intermediate situation, duopoly market, which is far more complicated than the 
two extremes, is analyzed in section five. In section six, we illustrate the various 
characteristics in these models numerically and consider both transitional dynamics and 
equilibrium. As the Scandinavian moose typically will be valuable and not a pest, we focus 
basically on the value case. Finally, section seven concludes the paper. 
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2. Model    
The moose (Alces alces) is the world’s largest member of the deer family and is found in the 
northern forests of North America, Europe and Russia. It is the most important game species 
in the Scandinavian countries. In Norway and Sweden about 40,000 and 100,000 animals, 
respectively, are shot every year (Statistics Norway [2011], Svenska Jägerforbundet [2009]). 
However, the moose population also causes various costs. There is a high incidence of moose-
vehicle collisions, as well as browsing damage during the winter, when young pine trees are 
an important food source (e.g., Solstad [2007]). The browsing damage may be considerable in 
some areas. Because of large spatial variation in densities during the winter season, browsing 
damage is usually unevenly distributed between different areas. Migration and concentration 
are two important factors explaining these differences, as some subpopulations tend to leave 
their summer ranges and browse in specific winter ranges due to snow and forage conditions 
(Saether et al. [1992], Ball et al. [2001]). Hence, as hunting takes place in the fall, before 
yearly migration, there is often an asymmetry between areas obtaining benefit from 
harvesting and areas with heavy browsing damage. 
 
Two areas, areas 1 and 2, with two different landowners, owners 1 and 2, and two 
subpopulations of moose, subpopulation 1 and 2, are considered. Both landowners are 
allowed to issue and sell licenses for hunting on their own land, and the licence fee is paid to 
the landowners. For subpopulation 1, we use the most common of three migration patterns 
(distinguished by Saether et al. [1992]); this is a distinct and more or less fixed yearly 
migration pattern between a summer range and a winter range. The migration may be of a 
rather short distance, possibly between two adjoining areas, or it may be a long distance 
migration, possibly of several hundred kilometres. Snow, topographical and forage conditions 
during the winter are of particular importance (Saether et al. [1992]). This migration pattern is 
modelled by letting a fixed (exogenous) fraction of one of the subpopulations migrate during 
the winter. By convention, we assume that the dispersal runs from area 1 to area 2. These two 
areas are considered as a closed system in which, after the winter, all the migratory moose 
return to their summer range. The migration system is the same as that in Skonhoft and 
Olaussen [2005] where a real life example is also provided. The hunting season is in 
September/October, before the yearly migration. Harvesting income is therefore directly 
related to the summer range of the two subpopulations. The migrating fraction of 
subpopulation 1 causes forestry damage in area 2 during the winter season, but subpopulation 
2 does not cause damage in area 1, because it is non-migratory. See Figure 1.         6 
 
  Figure 1 about here 
 
Neglecting any stochastic variations in environment and biology, the equations 
(1)  1 11 / () dX dt F X h = −  
 and 
(2)  2 22 / () dX dt G X h = −  
represent the populations dynamics, where  i X ( 1,2 i = )  is size of subpopulation i, measured 
in biomass (or number of animals) at time t (time index is omitted),  i h is harvest, and  1 () FX
and  2 () GX are density dependent natural growth functions. Natural growth is assumed to be 
logistic, where 1 1 11 ( ) (1 / ) F X rX X K = −  is for subpopulation 1 and  2 2 22 ( ) (1 / ) G X rX X K = −  
is for subpopulation 2.  0 r > is the identical intrinsic growth rate and 0 i K >  is the carrying 
capacity ( 1,2 i = ), typically depending on the size of the land and habitat productivity.  
Notice that there is no ecological interdependency between the two subpopulations, as there is 
no density dependent growth process, due to, e.g., forage competition, during the winter when 
part of the subpopulations are located within the same area. Generally, there is no evidence of 
density dependent mortality of the Scandinavian moose (see, e.g., Nilsen at al. [2005]).   
 
The fraction of the population migrating from area 1 to area 2 after hunting season, depending 
on snow and food conditions, as well as topography and size of the areas, is fixed as 01 α ≤≤ . 
The migratory population out of area 1 is therefore  1 X α so that the remaining stock browsing 
in its home range during the winter becomes 11 (1 ) ZX α = − .  22 1 ZX X α = +  is the stock 
browsing in area 2 during the winter season. As already indicated, the forest browsing damage 
on pine occurs during the winter when other food sources are restricted. The damage is 
directly related to the number of animals (Skonhoft and Olaussen [2005]; Wam and Hofstad 
[2007]). The damage cost function may vary between areas due to different quality of the 
timber stands, or simply because of different forest productivity.  Both a linear and a strictly 
convex function are considered, and the damage function is hence defined as () ii DZ with 
(0) 0 i D = ,  / '0 iii DZD ∂ ∂= >  and  '' 0 i D ≥  ( 1,2 i = ). 
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When the cost is assumed to account for a fixed fraction of the licence price, the yearly 
hunting income writes ii Ph such that  i P( 1,2 i = ) is the ‘net’ hunting licence price. The hunting 
licence price may be equal among the landowners, or it may be different due to different 
market and demand conditions. Two extremes, the market with perfect competition and the 
market with monopoly power, are considered, with the former situation possibly being the 
most common market structure in Scandinavia
1. In addition, market interaction through 
duopoly is studied. When any further cost and benefit components are neglected
2, the yearly 
net benefit for landowner 1 is: 
(3)  1 11 1 1 11 1 1 ( ) ((1 ) ) Ph D Z Ph D X πα = − = −−  
while 
(4)  2 22 2 2 22 2 2 1 () ( ) Ph D Z Ph D X X πα = − = −+    
is for landowner 2.  
 
Because of the dispersal, and also because the moose is not only a value but also a pest, there 
will be economic interdependency between the two landowners. We start by analysing 
interdependency under the perfect competition assumption. 
 
3. Price taking behaviour 
With perfect competition, both owners are price takers and sell hunting licenses at the given 
market price 12 PPP = = . When the owners aim to maximize present-value profit, the 
management problem of owner 1 is to maximize  
11
1 1 11 1
00
[ ((1 ) )]
tt PV e dt Ph D X e dt
δδ πα
∞∞
−− = =−− ∫∫  subject to the animal growth constraint (1) .  
In a similar manner, the management problem of landowner 2 is to maximize 
                                                   
1 In this paper, we are considering situations where hunting for meat is the main motive. For a more general 
discussion of institutional arrangements and factors affecting the hunting price, where hunting for trophy is also 
considered, see Naevdal et al. [2011].
2 As indicated, such costs may include the cost of moose-vehicle collisions, 
while the intrinsic value of moose could have been included as a possible benefit component. 
2 As indicated, such costs may include the cost of moose-vehicle collisions, while the intrinsic value of moose 
could have been included as a possible benefit component.         8 
22
2 2 2 22 1
00
[ ( )]
tt PV e dt Ph D X X e dt
δδ πα
∞∞
−− = = −+ ∫∫  subject to the animal growth constraint (2). 
1 0 δ ≥  and  2 0 δ ≥  are the discount rates for landowner 1 and 2, respectively. Notice that 
subpopulation 1 is included in landowners 2’s objective function, but not vice versa. 
 
For landowner 1, the current value Hamiltonian reads 
1 11 1 1 11 ((1 ) ) ( ( ) ) H Ph D X F X h αλ = −− + − , where  1 λ is the subpopulation 1 shadow value. 
The first order necessary conditions for this maximum problem read  11 1 /0 HhP λ ∂ ∂=− = and  
1 11 1 11 1 1 11 1 / / (1 ) '((1 ) ) '( ) d dt H X D X F X λ δλ δλ α α λ = −∂ = + − − −  when assuming an interior 
solution (harvesting takes place at the steady state). As the current value Hamiltonian is linear 
in the control variable, optimal harvest strategy is a combination of a singular solution and the 
Most Rapid Approach type (MRAP).  MRAP will be adopted before the steady state is 
reached while the singular solution will be applied once the steady state arrives. Accordingly, 
it is beneficial for the landowner to use the harvesting capacity up to its maximum if the 
initial stock level ( 0 t = ) is above that of steady state, 
*
11 (0) XX > , and postpone harvest until 
steady state is reached when
*
11 (0) XX < (superscript ‘*’ denotes the optimal steady state 
value). The sufficient condition of the above problem is that the Hamiltonian is jointly 
concave in the control and stock variables. With a strictly concave natural growth function, 
convex damage cost function and concave (linear) hunting revenue function, we find this 
condition satisfied (see also Appendix). 
 
The singular harvest solution, or sustainable harvest, follows as
**
11 () h FX = , while the 
optimal steady state, or ‘golden rule’, condition can be derived by combining the first order 












′ −− ′ = + . 
This condition says that the stock should be maintained such that the marginal natural growth 
is equal to the marginal grazing damage, evaluated at hunting license price, plus the discount 
rent. Multiplying with P and rearranging, equation (5) also indicates that stock should be kept 
at the point where marginal net benefit, namely, marginal harvesting value minus marginal         9 
browsing damage, should be equal to the marginal opportunity cost of keeping the stock. In 
other words, the net marginal value of the moose ‘in the forest’ should be equal to the 
marginal value of the moose ‘in the bank’. The equilibrium 
*
1 X will be unique as the damage 
function is convex, the natural growth function strictly concave and the hunting license price 
is fixed. It is seen that
*
11
msy XX < (msy = maximum sustainable yield). 
 
In a similar manner, the current value Hamiltonian of landowner 2 is  












′ + ′ = + , 
while the sustainable harvest reads 
**
22 () h GX = . Condition (6) has the same interpretation as 
equation (5) of landowner 1. However, due to dispersal, subpopulation 1 is included here as 
this subpopulation contributes to browsing damage also in area 2.  There is hence present a 
unidirectional externality through equations (5) and (6)
3. Because the adjustment of 
subpopulation 2 is contingent upon the growth pattern of subpopulation 1, this externality is 
also present through the transitional phase, before steady state is reached. For this reason, the 
dynamic path of subpopulation 2 may also be different from that of subpopulation 1. The 
economic interaction will be analysed under two damage cost function assumptions, namely 
constant marginal damage and increasing marginal damage.  
 
Case 1: Constant marginal damage 
When the marginal browsing damage of each area is constant, with  0 i a > ( 1,2 i = ), the 
browsing damage function is defined as () i i ii D Z aZ = ; that is,  11 1 (1 ) Da X α = − for area 1 and 
2 22 1 () D aX X α = + for area 2. When inserting the damage functions into the golden rule 
conditions (5) and (6), we find 
*
11 1 ( ) (1 ) / FX aP δα ′ =+−  and 
*
2 22 () / GX a P δ ′ = + , 
respectively. 
                                                   
3 In the present context, landowner 2 will typically argue that landowner 1 profits at her expense, but this 
argument is unconvincing, because harvesting of subpopulation 1 always reduces the browsing damage taking 
place in area 2. Notice, however, that a unified management scheme (social planner) will yield a smaller number 
of subpopulation 1 and hence less browsing damage in area 2 (Skonhoft and Olaussen [2005]).         10 
 
These conditions represent two independent equations, and hence, when the damage functions 
are linear, there is no management interaction among the landowners at the steady state. 
Because MRAP will be adopted by landowner 1, and because marginal damage in area 2 is 
constant for all sizes of the migratory population in the transitional phase, landowner 2 will 
also find it beneficial to adopt MRAP.  Therefore, there will not be any management 
interaction among the landowners before reaching steady state. This is stated as: 
Result 1: With price taking behaviour and constant marginal damage costs, there is no 
economic interdependency between the landowners.  
 
However, not surprisingly, the harvest decision of landowner 1 will influence the profitability 
of landowner 2, because the steady state profit reads 
* * **
2 2212 () ( ) PG X a X X πα = −+ . The 
profitability effect is channelled directly through the dispersal parameter, as well as indirectly 
through the size of migratory stock. Because increased dispersal means less browsing damage 
in area 1, we find  
*
1 /0 X α ∂ ∂>. Therefore, a higher dispersal rate and a higher area 1 optimal 
stock work in the same direction and reduce the landowner 2 profit. On the contrary, the 
landowner 1 steady state profit, 
** *
1 11 1 ( ) (1 ) PF X a X πα = −− , increases with more dispersal. 
This is due not only to reduction in browsing damage, but also to higher harvest income when
α shifts up. We also find the effects 
*
21 /0 πδ ∂ ∂>and 
*
21 /0 a π ∂ ∂>channelled through the 
size of the migratory stock. 
 
By inserting the logistic growth functions, explicit expressions for profit and stock size for 
both areas can be derived. The steady state stock sizes read as
( ) ( )
*
11 1 1 /2 1 / 1 / X K r a rP δα = − −−    and  ( )( )
*
22 2 2 /2 1 / / X K r a rP δ = −− while we find 
landowner 1 profit after some rearrangements as ( )
* 22
11 1 1 ( / 4 ){ [ 1 / ] } KP r r a P π αδ = −− − . The 
profit expression for landowner 2 is complicated, but is available upon request from the 
authors. 
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Case 2: Increasing marginal damage 
The damage function is now specified as
2 ( /2) ii i DbZ =  with  0 i b >  ( 1,2 i = ). The golden rule 
conditions become 
* 2*
1 11 1 ( ) (1 ) / FX b X P δα ′ = +−  and 
* **
2 22 1 2 ( ) ( )/ GX b X X P δα ′ = ++ , and 
are hence no longer independent equations. Therefore, landowner 1’s harvest decision 
influences the harvest decision of landowner 2. The subpopulation 1 dynamics are still of the 
MRAP type. Following, e.g., Wilen and Brown [1986], the subpopulation 2 dynamics will 
also be of the MRAP type
4. With this harvest strategy adopted in the transitional phase, there 
will also be a unidirectional management interaction among landowners before steady state is 
reached. We find a similar effect whenever the landowner 2 marginal cost is not constant 
(which suggests that the sufficient conditions hold). This is stated as:  
Result 2. With price taking behaviour and changing marginal damage cost, there is a 
unidirectional economic interdependency between the landowners in the transitional phase as 
well as in the steady state.  
 
It can easily be shown that more dispersal through a higher α unambiguously increases 
subpopulation 1 and reduces subpopulation 2. Just as in the constant marginal cost case, more 
migration also means lower profit for landowner 2 and higher profit for landowner 1. We still 
find that a more myopic harvest strategy of landowner 1 yields
*
21 /0 πδ ∂ ∂>, but now 
*
21 /0 X δ ∂ ∂>.The steady state stock sizes can be found explicitly when applying the logistic 
natural growth functions as 
*
1 1 1 11 ( ) / [2 (1 )] X K P r rP K b δα =− +−  and 
( ) ( )
2 *
2 2 2 1 22 2 11 1 /2 {( ) ( ) /[ 1 2 ]} K P r b r rP b K X K b a K rP δ αδ = −− + − −+ . Both profit 
expressions are complicated and are available upon request from the authors. Profit 
interactions between the landowners will also be demonstrated in the numerical section six. 
 
4. Monopoly market 
So far, the market for hunting licenses is assumed to be competitive, with equal hunting price 
facing both landowners. We now turn to monopoly power as the other extreme, with the 
inverse demand functions given as  () i ii P Ph = and where '0 i P <  ( 1,2 i = ). It is further assumed 
                                                   
4 Wilen and Brown [1986] studied a one-way tropic interaction ecological system where the prey abundance 
(lower tropical level) influences the predator natural growth, but not vice versa. In their model, only the predator 
is harvested and the profit is linear in the harvest. The management of the predator harvest in this system is 
therefore, in principle, the same as the management of subpopulation 2.          12 
that the hunting revenue function () iii Phhof both landowners is strictly concave, i.e., 
( '' 2 ') 0 ii i Ph P +< . As indicated in section two, the two areas can be neighbouring areas, or 
they can be located rather far away from each other if there is long-distance migration. 
Obviously, the possibility of monopoly pricing fits the last case best. The current Hamiltonian 
function of landowner 1 reads now  1 111 1 1 1 1 1 ( ) ((1 ) ) ( ( ) ) H Phh D X FX h αλ = −− + −  with 
control condition  1 1 11 1 11 1 / () ' () 0 H h Ph P hh λ ∂ ∂= + − = . The portfolio condition is the same as 
that in the competitive case. Combining these two equations gives: 
(7)  1 11 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 / [( ( ) '( ) )( '( )) (1 ) '((1 ) )]/( ''( ) 2 '( )) dh dt P h P h h F X D X P h h P h δ αα = + − +− − + . 
Therefore, this equation together with equation (1) yields the dynamics of landowner 1’s 






(1 ) ((1 ) )
()






′ −− ′ = +
′ +
.   
This condition conveys similar a message as that in the competitive case, except that the 
marginal revenue term  11 P PF ′ + now is included to value the moose. As long as the marginal 
revenue is positive, that is,  11 0 P PF ′ +>   in the optimal solution, 
*
11
msy XX < still holds. On the 
other hand, if  11 0 P PF ′ +< , the solution can be located at the right hand side of  1
msy X (more 
details below).  
 
The  1 h -isocline is defined through equation (7) and reads   1 11 1 1 ( ' )( ') (1 ) ' 0 P Ph F D δα + − +− = . 
When taking the total differential, we find  
2
1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 / [( ' ) '' (1 ) '']/[( '' 2 ')( ')] dh dX P P h F D P h P F αδ = + −− + −  after a small rearrangement. 
With  1 α = and hence no browsing damage in area 1, the isocline is simply fixed by 
1 ( ') 0 F δ −= . Otherwise, when01 α ≤< , it is negatively sloped and defined for all stock 
values  1 [0, ] K  except when  1 ( ') 0 F δ −= . Figure 2 illustrates.  It is assumed that the part of 
the isocline to the right of the asymptote  1 ( ') 0 F δ −=  intersects twice with the 1 X -isocline 
11 () h FX = .  
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Therefore, the situation depicted in this figure indicates three equilibria with different 
characteristics. Equilibrium point I, where ( ') 0 F δ −< , and hence also
*
11
msy XX < , is 
accompanied by a positive marginal hunting revenue,  1 11 ( ')0 P Ph +> . This follows directly 
from the above definition of the  1 h -isocline. Positive marginal hunting revenue also implies a 
positive shadow price, 1 0 λ > , such that this subpopulation represents a value. On the other 
hand, at the two other equilibria, II and III, where( ') 0 F δ −> , we have 1 11 ( ')0 P Ph +< . The 
shadow price is then negative,  1 0 λ < , and the moose may be regarded as a nuisance, or pest 
5. 
Therefore, in the pest case, the equilibrium harvest II or III must be larger and the equilibrium 
price lower than in the value case where marginal harvesting revenue is positive.  
 
From the definition of the  1 h -isocline, we find that equilibrium point I always will exist, 
while the occurrence of II and III depends upon circumstances, such as the demand for 
hunting licenses and the severity of browsing damage. For instance, equilibria II and III will 
exist only when the demand for hunting licenses is ‘low’. Otherwise, this part of the  1 h -
isocline will not intersect with the  1 X -isocline, and point I will be the only equilibrium. 
Equilibrium  I is saddle point stable, while the other ones, if existing, will either be saddle 
point stable or unstable. See Appendix for a formal proof. In the Appendix, we also show that 
the current value Hamiltonian is jointly concave in the control and stock variable at 
equilibrium point I, and hence this point is a (local) maximum. On the other hand, 
characteristics of points II and III depend on the parameter values of the damage function and 
the population growth function.  When either point II or point III is a saddle point or when 
both points are saddle points, or when the optimality of the point(s) cannot be determined, 
equilibrium point I will be the global maximum equilibrium, and there could be a control rule 
that spans the entire control-state space that leads to point I, even if point II and III exist. See 
Figure 2, and also Figure 4 numerical section below. See also the discussion in Wirl and 
Feichtinger [2005] and Brock and Starrett [2003]. In what follows, we will examine the value 
case with positive marginal revenue of the harvest, because this case fits the reality of 
Scandinavian moose hunting (e.g., Solstad [2007]). More precisely, the value case here means 
                                                   
5 Similar classifications, but in other settings, can be found in Schulz and Skonhoft [1996], Zivin et al. [2000] 
and Horan and Bulte [2004]. 
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the demand for hunting licences is ‘high’ such that equilibria II and III do not exist (see also 
below).   
 
  Figure 2 about here 
For landowner 2, the control condition reads  2 2 22 2 22 2 / () ' () 0 H h Ph P hh λ ∂ ∂= + − = , while the 





2 22 2 2
()
()
(( ) ) (( ) )( )
DXX
GX
PGX P GX GX
α
δ
′ + ′ = +
′ +
. 
The  2 h -isocline is defined by  2 22 2 2 ( ' )( ') ' 0 P Ph G D δ + −+= . As for landowner 1, there can 
either be one equilibrium or three equilibria. The difference is that these equilibria may be 
contingent upon the size of subpopulation 1; in this case, only the equilibrium where the 
moose represents a value, corresponding to point I in Figure 2 for landowner 1, is a global 
maximum steady state. With a constant marginal damage cost, however, there will be no 
interaction among the stocks and hence no management interdependency (see below). The 
dynamics of landowner 2’s management problem will then not differ from that of landowner 
1. On the other hand, with increasing marginal damage, there will be economic 
interdependency. This interaction can be complex, as landowner 1’s management may 
influence the speed and circumstances under which equilibrium I of landowner 2 will be 
reached. This is stated as: 
Result 3:  With monopolistic hunting licence pricing, there may be a complex economic 
unidirectional management interdependency among the landowners. 
 
Economic interaction will now be analysed in detail under both constant and increasing 
marginal damage cost.  In both cases, the linear inverse demand curve, i i ii Ph γβ = −  with 
0 i γ > and  0 i β > ( 1,2 i = ), is applied. Again, we start with the constant marginal case. 
 
 Case 1: Constant marginal damage 
With constant marginal damage, and the linear demand function, the  1 h -isocline reads         15 
1 11 1 1 1 ( 2 )[ '( )] (1 ) 0 h FX a γβδ α − − + −= which may also be written as  
1 11 1 1 1 (1/ 2 )[ (1 )/( '( ))] h a FX βγ α δ = +− − .  Differentiation yields  
2
1 1 11 1 / (1/ 2 ) (1 ) ''/ ( ') 0 dh dX a F F β αδ = − −< .  1 h unambiguously shifts down with shrinking 
market demand conditions through smaller  1 γ and/or higher 1 β . In addition, it shifts down with 
less damage and a smaller  1 a when  1 ( ') 0 F δ −> , and does the opposite when  1 ( ') 0 F δ −< . 
This confirms the above discussion about potential forces making the moose a pest, with 
negative marginal hunting revenue 
*
1 11 ( 2 )0 h γβ −<  and two intersections between the  1 h -
isocline and the  1 X -isocline when  1 ( ') 0 F δ −> . We also see that more dispersal shifts up the 
1 h -isocline in the value case and hence the steady state stock becomes higher. The golden rule 
condition now satisfies 
**
1 1 11 1 1 () ( 1 ) / [ 2 () ] F X a FX δ α γβ ′ =+− − . 
 
For landowner 2, the golden rule condition reads 
**
2 222 2 2 () / [ 2 () ] G X a GX δ γβ ′ = +− . Just as 
under the perfect competition assumption, there is no stock interaction, and landowner 2’s 
management is independent of landowner 1’s management at the steady state. This will also 
be so during the transitional phase before steady state is reached. The conditions for obtaining 
one, or three equilibria, will be of a similar type. Also, for landowner 2, the equilibrium 
conveying the value case with 
*
2 22 20 h γβ −>  will be the maximum, and there could be a 
control rule that spans the entire control-state space that leads to point I, even if point II and 
III exist. We may then state: 
Result 4: With monopoly pricing and constant marginal damage, there is still no management 
interaction among landowners. In the value case, more dispersal means a larger steady state 
size of subpopulation 1, while the size of subpopulation 2 is not affected.  
 
We may also compare the optimal steady state stocks and harvest under the monopoly market 
with that under the competitive market in the situation where the moose represents a value. In 
order to make the market price of a hunting license comparable under these two market 
structures, we introduce the same downward sloping linear demand schedule in both cases. 
The harvest dynamics of landowner 1 with price taking may then be written as          16 
1 11 1 1 / [( )( '( )) (1 ) '((1 ) )]/ ( ) i ii i dh dt h F X D X γβ δ α α β = − − +− − − , and we find the  1 h -isocline 
as ( ) 1 111 1 1 1/ [ (1 )/( '( ))] h a FX βγ α δ = +− − . It can easily be shown that the intersection of the 
1 h -isocline with the  1 X -axis is similar in the price taking case and monopoly case, while the 
intersection with the  1 h -axis takes place at a higher value in the price taking case. Therefore, 
the  1 h -isocline intersects with the  1 X -isocline at a point with more animals hunted in the 
competitive case than in the monopoly case.  That is, in the competitive case, we find a higher 
number of animals hunted and hence, as suspected, a lower price. At the same time, this 
means that the equilibrium stock is higher in the competitive case than in the monopoly case. 
This result is stated as: 
Result 5: When moose is considered valuable, with a linear demand function and a linear 
browsing damage function, monopoly leads to a less stock-conserving harvest policy than that 
in the competitive case.  
 
This result contrasts with what is often found in resource economic models, but we reach 
similar results as those in Staahler [1996] and Bulte and van Kooten [2002]. The above 
reasoning could also be related to the analysis of Wirl and Feichtinger [2005] and Clark [1990, 
Ch. 6.3]. Clark also studies a situation with a falling marginal revenue curve, but no damage, 
and ends up with three equilibria, just as in Figure 2.  
 
Case 2:  Increasing marginal damage 
With increasing marginal browsing damage and the cost functions written as 
2 ( /2) ii i DbZ =
( 1,2 i = ), we find the  1 h -isocline to satisfy 
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 states the golden rule condition for landowner 2.          17 
Therefore, with increasing marginal cost, just as in the price taking market situation, there is a 
unidirectional management interaction at the steady state as well as during the transitional 
phase before reaching the steady state. In the value case where demand and cost conditions 
ensure a unique equilibrium, the dynamics for both subpopulations are of the saddle point 
type.  The impact of dispersal rate change on the steady state with increasing marginal 
damage is illustrated in the numerical section six.  
 
5. Duopoly market 
 
In sections three and four, two extreme market situations have been considered. We now 
proceed to analyse an intermediate case with market interaction among the agents structured 
as a duopoly. Both landowners then face the same inverse demand function 12 () P Ph h = +  
with  '0 P < . With an infinite planning horizon, the two landowners play a dynamic Cournot 
game. Only the value case with positive marginal revenue of the harvest is examined. 
 
We consider the open loop strategy in the Cournot game. That is, the landowners commit 
their optimal harvest (number of hunting licenses) to each other at time  0 t =  over the infinite 
planning horizon, given the expectation of the entire optimal harvest path of the other player 
(Dockner et al. [2000]).  The closed loop Nash equilibrium, which conditions next period 
harvest strategy on the current state (i.e., Markovian strategies), is thus left out of our analysis. 
The main reason is that it is too complex to identify proper value functions for nonlinear 
Hamiltonians in a closed loop game. Although we may expect different harvesting levels 
under Markovian strategies, our results with open loop Nash equilibrium is sufficient to 
demonstrate that not only unidirectional migration but also the interaction of hunting licence 
prices affects harvesting strategy. Therefore, the management problem of landowner 1 under 
the open loop strategy is to maximize present-value profit
1
1 1 21 1 1
0
[ ( ) ((1 ) )]
t PV P h h h D X e dt
δ α
∞
− = +−− ∫  subject to the animal growth constraint (1) and 
the expected harvest  2 h of landowner 2.  In a similar manner, the management problem of 
landowner 2 is to maximize 
2
2 1 22 2 1 2
0
[ ( ) ( )]
t PV P h h h D X X e dt
δ α
∞
− = +− + ∫  subject to growth 
constraints (2) and the expected harvest  1 h , but also subject to 1 X .          18 
 
The current value Hamilton of landowner 1 reads  
1 1 21 1 1 1 1 1 ( ) ( ( 1 )) ( () ) H Ph h h D X FX h αλ =+−− + −  with the control condition 
11 12 12 11 / () () 0 H hP hh P hh hλ ′ ∂ ∂= + + + − =  . The portfolio condition is the same as in the 
previous market cases. When combining these equations, we find the harvest dynamics for 
landowner 1as: 
(10)  121 122 2 '( ) / '( ) / P h h dh dt P h h dh dt + ++ = 
1 1 12 1 12 1 1 ( '( ))( '( ) ( )) (1 ) '((1 ) ) F X P hh hP hh D X δ αα − + + + +− − . 
In a similar way, the harvest dynamics for landowner 2 reads: 
(11)  122 121 2 '( ) / '( ) / P h h dh dt P h h dh dt + ++ =
  2 2 12 2 12 2 1 2 ( '( ))( '( ) ( )) '( ) G X P hh hP hh D X X δα − + + ++ +.  
Equations (10) and (11), together with the population dynamics constraints (1) and (2), define 
the dynamics of the open loop game. In contrast to the competitive market and the monopoly 
market, the interaction among the agents is no longer unidirectional.   2 / dh dt as well as  2 h are 
included in condition (10), while  1/ dh dt and  1 h are included in condition (11). This is stated 
as: 
Result 6: Because of the market interaction, there is a reciprocal economic interaction among 
the agents. The interaction channels through the hunting market as well as through migration. 
 
The 1 h -isocline found through (10) is  1 11 ( ')( ' ) (1 ) ' 0 F P Ph D δα − + +− = .  For a fixed value of 
2 h , it has a similar shape to the isocline in the monopoly case (Figure 2). When the moose is 
considered valuable, which is the case here, the  1 h -isocline intersects once with the  1 X -
isocline and ensures a unique solution. The  2 h -isocline having a similar shape which, for a 
given value of  1 h , also indicates a unique intersection between this isocline and the  2 X -
isocline when the moose is  considered valuable.  The golden rule stock condition for 
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. 
The golden rule conditions represented by these two equations also include marginal revenue 
terms to value whether the moose should be kept in the forest or in the bank. 
 
The impact of dispersal rate α on the steady state stocks and harvests in the duopoly market is 
different from that of the competitive and monopoly case. With fixed marginal damage cost, 
landowner 2’s harvest decision is unaffected by the amount of dispersal in the competitive 
and monopoly market situations. Under the duopoly market, on the other hand, we find that a 
higher dispersal rate will lower the steady stock
*
2 X and harvest 
*
2 h  through the market price 
interaction.  In a first step, higher dispersal rateα  increases 
*
1 X and 
*
1 h . Higher 
*
1 h  next 
lowers marginal harvest revenue of landowner 2 and reduces the steady stock
*
2 X and harvest 
*
2 h . When browsing damage is nonlinear, dispersal rate change affects landowner 2’s decision 
through changes in both market price and marginal browsing damage. These effects are 
similar to those in the monopoly case. The numerical simulations (next section) confirm these 
analytical findings.  
  
6. Numerical Illustration 
6.1 Data and specific functional forms 
The above theoretical reasoning will now be illustrated numerically. As already specified, 
animal growth is described by the standard logistic growth function. The damage functions 
also follow previous specifications, and results with both linear and strictly convex functional 
forms are demonstrated. The same linear demand function is assumed for both monopoly and 
duopoly market.  The slope and the choke price are assumed to be similar for both landowners, 
i.e.,  12 βββ = = and  12 γγγ = = . The choke price is fixed as  10,000 γ =  (NOK/animal) while 
the slope is given as 12 6.77 ββ = = (NOK/animal
2). The same discount rate is also assumed 
for both landowners. The value of the intrinsic growth rate of moose is based on Skonhoft and         20 
Olaussen [2005], while the carrying capacity, typically depending on the size of the areas 
(section two), is assumed similar  12 4,550 KK = = (number of animals) for both 
subpopulations. The maximum sustainable yield stock level is therefore 2,275
msy
i X =  
( 1, 2 i = ). The baseline dispersal rate is assumed to be 20%, that is,  0.20 α = (Skonhoft and 
Olaussen [2005]). Browsing damage, cost data and price data are adopted from Solstad [2007]. 
Table 1 summarizes the baseline data used in the simulations. For these baseline data, the 
harvest isoclines intersect with the natural growth functions only once in the monopoly and 
duopoly market situations (again, see Figure 2). Hence these data convey information only 
about the case in which moose are regarded as valuable. We examine the robustness of other 
results by changing some of the key parameter values such as the dispersal rate. We also 
examine what happens in the monopoly case when the demand for hunting licence is ‘low’, 
such that the pest case and three steady states are included. The effect of the changed initial 
situation in the monopoly case is also studied to confirm whether there is a control rule that 
spans the entire control-state space leading to point I, even if point II and III exist. 
 
  Table 1 about here 
   
6.2 Results 
Tables 2-4 report optimal steady state stock levels and harvest under the three different 
market assumptions. Results with different dispersal rates are included to illustrate different 
migration patterns. Price taking behaviour is first considered in Table 2. The results confirm 
that the degree of dispersal has no effect on the size of subpopulation 2 when marginal 
browsing damage cost is constant (Result 1). The opposite happens for landowner 1, who 
finds it beneficial to keep a larger subpopulation and harvest more with more dispersal. It is 
also seen that more dispersal means higher profit for landowner 1 and less profit for 
landowner 2. With increasing marginal damage, more dispersal means a larger subpopulation 
1, which spills over to a lower subpopulation 2 (Result 2). As expected, the population sizes 
are always below that of
msy
i X ( 1, 2 i = ). 
 
Table 2 about here         21 
 
Table 3 demonstrates what occurs under monopoly pricing. We find that  11 '( ) 0 FX δ −= and 
22 '( ) 0 GX δ −= yield  12 2,033 XX = = . Therefore, for the baseline demand conditions, all 
optimal stock values in Table 3 (and Table 4, see below) are below the critical number, 
indicating that we have the value case. In the baseline case with 0.2 α = , landowner 1 charges 
the monopoly price 
**
1 1 11 10,000 6.77 499 Ph γβ = − = −⋅= 6,622 (NOK/animal) while 
landowner 2 charges 6,683 (NOK/animal). The marginal revenues are
*
1 11 2 h γβ −=3,243 and 
*
2 22 2 h γβ −=3,367 (NOK/animal), respectively.  With constant marginal damage, there is still 
no management interaction among landowners (Result 4). However, just as in the competitive 
market price case, the profit for landowner 1 increases with a higher dispersal rate, while it 
decreases for landowner 2. With a linear demand function and a linear browsing damage 
function, we found that monopoly leads to a less stock-conserving harvest policy than in the 
competitive case when moose is considered as a value (Result 5). However, as the price is 
fixed as  5,000 P = (Table 1), and hence no downward sloping demand function is introduced 
in the competitive case reported in Table 2, stock values as well as harvest are not comparable 
in that respect here.  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
The steady state results of the duopoly market are reported in Table 4, where only the value 
case is considered. Steady state stock of subpopulation 2 decreases with higher dispersal rate 
even under the constant marginal damage cost assumption (Result 6). With baseline dispersal 
rate  0.2 α =  and linear damage functions, market price for the hunting licence equals 
* **
1 11 2 ( ) 10,000 6.77(428 406) 4353 P hh γβ = − += − + = (NOK/animal).  The marginal revenue 
for the landowner 1 and 2 are 1,453 NOK and 1,605 NOK, respectively. Impacts of dispersal 
rate change on the profit for the two landowners work in the same manner as those in the 
competitive and the monopoly market cases. 
   
Table 4 about here 
         22 
We then look at the dynamics. The dynamics under the competitive market are of the MRAP 
type. Accordingly, if the initial stock  1(0) X is lower than the steady state stock, no harvest 
will take place. The dynamic path of subpopulation 1 then simply follows the solution of 
1 1 11 / (1 / ) dX dt rX X K = − ,  or  11 11 1 /{ [( (0))/ (0)] 1}
rt X Ke KX X
− = −+ . The subpopulation 2 
dynamic path has a similar pattern.   
 
Figure 3 shows the dynamics for the two subpopulations under the monopoly market and the 
duopoly market for baseline value of  0.2 α = , and for  0.4 α =  when the marginal damage is 
constant
6. We again only consider the value case with a ‘high’ demand and  10,000 γ =
(NOK/animal) and hence with only one steady state equilibrium and with saddle path 
dynamics under both market forms. In the linear damage case, the possibility of a complex 
unidirectional management interdependency among the landowners is not present, unlike the 
general monopoly situation (Result 3). Figure 3 indicates that a higher dispersal rate yields a 
higher stock size of subpopulation 1 at every point of time along the transitional phases as 
well as in the steady state (see also Tables 3 and 4) under the monopoly market and the 
duopoly market. For subpopulation 2, there are no changes with increasing dispersal in the 
monopoly case (Result 4), while the steady states as well as the transitional paths shift down 
with more dispersal in the duopoly market.  
 
  Figure 3 about here 
 
Although the following results are not presented in the paper, but are available upon request 
from the authors, we find that, with increasing marginal browsing damage, the dynamic paths 
of subpopulation 1 will exhibit similar pattern as those under constant marginal damage. For 
subpopulation 2, the transitional dynamics will be similar to that of the duopoly market under 
constant marginal damage; that is, the stock will be affected by dispersal rate in both markets 
with nonlinear browsing damage. In the monopoly market, the impact channels only through 
increased marginal damage. A higher migration rate will raise marginal damage both directly 
                                                   
6 The dynamic optimization was performed with the Boundary Value Problem (BVP) of Sumlink tool box in 
Matlab 7.0.           23 
and indirectly by increasing subpopulation 1 and by reducing the stock of subpopulation 2. In 
the duopoly market, however, the impact operates through both market factors and marginal 
browsing damage.  
 
Figure 4 presents the  11 Xh − phase plane and dynamic paths for subpopulation 1 with 
different initial stock values under the monopoly market. The upper panel shows the baseline 
case situation when the demand for hunting licence is ‘high’ with 1 10,000 γ = (NOK/animal), 
the moose is valuable, and point I is the only steady state. The parabola describes the saddle 
path of an initial point starting from the left side of the steady state with  1(0) 800 X = . See 
also Figure 3.  The lower panel demonstrates the situation when demand for hunting license is 
‘low’ with  1 4,000 γ =  (NOK/animal) and there exist three equilibra (see also Figure 2). The 
saddle path demonstrates that when subpopulation 1 initially has a relatively high  value as 
given by  1(0) 3,500 X = , the stock value may decrease over time and reach equilibrium I even 
if point II and III exist. 
 
  Figure 4 about here 
 
7. Concluding remarks   
Using Scandinavian moose as an example, we have analyzed the economic interdependency 
of exploitation of two subpopulations of wildlife located in two areas with two landowners, 
and have considered three market situations with both linear and nonlinear damage cost 
assumptions.  Just as in models with ecological interconnections, and models where wildlife 
or fish populations disperse in a density dependent manner between different areas, we find in 
this paper that damage associated with density independent dispersal and market price 
interaction can create economic interdependency between different agents.  
 
Table 5 about here 
Our main findings may be summarized as follows (Table 5). Under price taking behaviour, 
the combination of MRAP and singular path at equilibrium is the optimal harvest strategy for 
both landowners. Harvest along the singular path at equilibrium is the optimal strategy in both         24 
monopoly and duopoly markets when moose are regarded as valuable. The stock and the 
harvest of the subpopulation that migrates in our model increases with dispersal rate in all the 
three markets, regardless of cost specification. Under price taking as well as monopoly 
pricing, when a linear damage function is assumed, optimal stock and its dynamic path for the 
non-migratory subpopulation whose landowner suffers from dispersal-associated browsing 
damage is not affected by the dispersal rate change of the other migratory subpopulation. The  
non-migratory subpopulation will decrease with a higher dispersal rate when the damage 
function is nonlinear. In the duopoly market, the stock and dynamic path of this subpopulation 
shift down under both linear and nonlinear cost functions, due to the effect of price interaction 
in addition to change in browsing damage. The result is robust in both equilibrium and 
dynamic states.  We reach similar results as those in Staahler [1996] and Bulte and van 
Kooten [2002], showing that the market with perfect competition works in a more stock-
conservative manner than does a monopoly market. Nevertheless, our results are different 
from the findings in Halsema and Withagen [2008] due to the different type of stock-
dependent cost assumed in our model.  
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FIGURE 1: The moose migration pattern.  
Figure note: Notice that our model (Equations (1)-( 4))  is formulated in continuous time 
indicating that all events over the year cycle take place simultaneously. 
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FIGURE 2. Isoclines of landowner 1’s management problem under monopoly pricing. Solid 
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  Monopoly market     Duopoly market 
  Subpopulation 1 X     Subpopulation 1 X  
 
  Monopoly market  Duopoly market 
  Subpopulation 2 X   Subpopulation 2 X  
   
FIGURE 3. Transitional stock dynamics. Monopoly market and duopoly market.  Constant 
marginal costs and different dispersal rates. Initial stock size 12 (0) (0) 800 XX = = . Straight 
lines: baseline value with dispersal rate,  0.2 α = . Lines with asterisk: high dispersal rate, 




























Dynamic path of x1 with constant marginal damage




















Dynamic path of x1 with constant marginal damage























Dynamic path of x2 with constant marginal damage
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FIGURE 4. The 11 Xh − phase planes with and saddle paths for subpopulation 1 with different 
initial points under monopoly market.  Linear damage function is assumed. Upper panel: 
Moose regarded as valuable and demand for hunting licenses is ‘high’:  1 10,000 γ =
(NOK/animal). Lower panel: Moose regarded as a pest and  demand for hunting licenses is 
‘low’: 1 4,000 γ = (NOK/animal). The straight dash-dot line: asymptote 1 ( ') 0 F δ −= .  Curving 
dash-dot lines:  1 h -isoclines.  The dashed line:  1 X -isocline. Lines with asterisk: saddle paths. 















Saddle path of x1 with constant marginal damage

























Saddle path of x1 with constant marginal damage
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Intrinsic growth rate  0.47 r =  
Carrying capacity 
 
12 4,550 KK = = (number of 
animals) 
Discount rent 
12 0.05 δδ = =  
Market price (price taking behaviour)  5,000 P = (NOK/animal) 
Slope parameter demand curve  
12 6.77 ββ = = (NOK/animal
2) 
Choke price demand curve 
12 10,000 γγ = = (NOK/animal) 
Constant marginal damage coefficient 
12 290 aa = = (NOK/animal) 
Increasing marginal damage coefficient 
12 1.6 bb = = (NOK/animal
2) 
Dispersal parameter  0.2 α =  
 
 
TABLE 2. Steady states under price taking behaviour. Optimal harvest 
*
i h (number of 
animals), stock level
*
i X  (number of animals) and profit 
*
i π (in 1,000 NOK)  
  Constant marginal damage  Increasing marginal damage 
0 α =   0.2 α =   0.4 α =   0 α =   0.2 α =   0.4 α =  
*
1 X   1,752  1,808  1,865  798  1,021  1,305   
*
2 X   1,752  1,752    1,752  798  674  480 
*
1 h   506  512  517  309  372  437 
*
2 h   506  506  506  309  270  202 
*
1 π   2,024  2,141  2,262  1,037  1,327  1,697 
*
2 π   2,024  1,919  1,808  1,037  732  206  
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TABLE 3. Steady states monopoly market when moose are regarded as valuable. Optimal 
harvest 
*
i h (number of animals), stock level
*
i X  (number of animals) and profit 
*
i π (in 1,000 
NOK)   
  Constant marginal damage  Increasing marginal damage 
  0 α =   0.2 α =   0.4 α =   0 α =   0.2 α =   0.4 α =  
*
1 X   1,616  1,687  1,764  852  1,018  1,231 
*
2 X   1,616  1,616  1,616  852  767  654 
*
1 h   490  499  508  326  371  422 
*
2 h   490  490  490  326  300  263 
*
1 π   2,806  2,913  3,026  1,960  2,248  2,578 
*
2 π   2,806  2,708  2,601  1,960  1,637  1,110 
 
 
TABLE 4. Steady statesduopoly market when moose are regarded as valuable. Optimal 
harvest 
*
i h (number of animals), stock level
*
i X  (number of animals) and profit 
*
i π (in 1,000 
NOK)  
  Constant marginal damage  Increasing marginal damage 
0 α =   0.2 α =   0.4 α =   0 α =   0.2 α =   0.4 α =  
*
1 X   1,181  1,260  1,354  718  880  1,104 
*
2 X   1,181  1,158  1,133  718  618  481 
*
1 h   411  428  447  284  334  393 
*
2 h   411  406  400  284  251  202 
*
1 π   1,480  1,572  1,672  1,336  1,619  1,995 
*
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TABLE 5.Summary of optimal harvest strategies and impacts on optimal steady state stocks. 
Moose are considered as valuable in the monopoly as well as duopoly market situation. 
  Optimal harvest 
strategies 
The impact of migration rate on optimal stocks for 






1 X  
*
2 X  
*
1 X  
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In this appendix we look at the properties of the Hamiltonian and stability conditions in the 
monopoly case for landowner 1 (area 1). We first find 
22
1 1 11 1 1 1 11 11 1 1 1 / '( ) ''( ) '( ) 2 '( ) ''( ) 0 H h Ph Phh Ph Ph Phh ∂ ∂= + + = + < due to concavity of the 
revenue function. With linear demand function, it simplifies further to 
22
1 1 11 / 2 '( ) 0 H h Ph ∂ ∂= < . We next find
22 2
11 1 11 1 / (1 ) ''((1 ) ) ''( ) H X D X FX α αλ ∂ ∂ = −− − + .  
 
When the moose are regarded valuable and  1 11 1 11 () ' () 0 Ph P hh λ = +> , we have
22
11 /0 HX ∂ ∂<
as the damage function is convex and the natural growth function is concave. Because of
2
1 11 /0 H hX ∂ ∂∂ = , the determinant of the Hessian matrix is positive and the Hamiltonian is 
concave in the stock and control variables, and hence equilibrium point I represent a (local) 
maximum point.  
 
In the pest case with  1 11 1 11 () ' () 0 Ph P hh λ = +< , the sign of 
22
11 / HX ∂∂ is general unclear. 
However, under the assumption of linear damage function, i.e. 11 ''((1 ) ) 0 DX α −= , we find
22
111 1 / ''( ) 0 H X FX λ ∂ ∂= > . Therefore, the determinant of the Hessian is negative and the 
extremes II and III representing the pest case are not maximums, but of the saddle type. When 
damage is nonlinear, i.e.  11 ''((1 ) ) 0 DX α −> , the sign of 
22
11 / HX ∂∂ depends on the parameter 
values of the damage function and the population growth function. If the damage function is 
weakly convex, we also reach the conclusion that the Hamiltonian is not concave but has 
saddle point properties. If the damage function is strongly convex, the Hamiltonian could still 
be concave in the stock and control variables. Similar reasoning applies to landowner 2 and 
area 2. 
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We now  analyze the stability properties of the dynamic system in the neighbourhood of  the 
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 . The eigenvalues 
are found through   
[ ][ ] ( ) 11 1 11 1 1 1
111
11
(() ' ())' ' ( )( 1 ) ' ' ( 1 )
'( ) '( ) 0
2 '( )





− + +− −
− − −+ =  , or
 
[ ] ( ) 11 1 11 1 1 1 2
1 11 1
11
(() ' ())' ' ( )( 1 ) ' ' ( 1 )
'( ) '( ) 0
2 '( )





− + +− −
−+ − + =
 
 
When moose are regarded as valuable,  1 '( ) 0 FX> ,  11 '( ) 0 FX δ −< and the marginal revenue 
satisfies 11 1 11 () ' () 0 Ph P hh +> . Since the three inequalities hold, i.e.  1 ''( ) 0 FX< , 
( ) 11 '' (1 ) 0 DX α −≥ and  11 '( ) 0 Ph< , we reach 
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This implies that one eigenvalue is positive and the other is negative. Therefore, the system in 
the neighbourhood of  equilibrium point I shows saddle path dynamics.  
 
When moose are regarded as nuisance,  11 '( ) 0 FX δ −> and the marginal harvesting revenue 
satisfies 11 1 11 () ' () 0 Ph P hh +< . For equilibrium II, when  1 '( ) 0 FX>  and the damage function 
11 ''((1 ) ) DX α − is linear or just weakly convex,  () 0 Det J > .  121 Since 0 λλδ +=> , both 
eigenvalues are positive. The
 
system near point II will then be unstable. If and only if the 
damage function is  strongly convex, the system near point II will exhibit saddle path 
dynamics.  
 
When  1 '( ) 0 FX< , the dynamics near equilibrium II and equilibrium III will share similar 
characteristics With linear damage function,  () 0 Det J > if the marginal revenue has large 
negative value or the demand has a gentle negative slope. The system near point II and III will 
then be unstable. When damage function  11 ''((1 ) ) DX α − is strongly convex or marginal 
revenue is slightly negative,  () 0 Det J < . This implies that both points are saddle point stable. 
 
 